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i
Tension between Ottawa and Quebec exploded during the Trudeau years. The 
FLQ crisis, proclamation of the War Measures A ct, election of the Parti 
Québécois, stalemate over constitutional reform, the Quebec Referendum and 
the humiliation of Quebec at patriation created anxiety in the political rela­
tionship between Canada’s English and French communities. An augmented lan­
guage politics surfaced, supercharged with significance. Each new language con­
flict reminded everyone that the language pot could boil over unpredictably, ex­
tinguishing all hopes for the grand Canadian experiment. Independence for 
Quebec became substantial and intimidating.
In 1969 the Official Languages Act1 sought to make the Federal Government 
open and accessible to Quebeckers through instituting a comprehensive program 
of language equality. This program included provision for bilingual service to the 
public, the use of English and French as languages of work in the public service 
and the equitable participation of anglophones and francophones in pubüc service 
employment. At the same time, Ottawa provided new support to official lan­
guage minorities in the provinces - support for their political lobbies, cultural ac­
tivities, educational structures - even support for court actions brought by them to 
enforce constitutionally guaranteed language rights. The purpose of Ottawa s ef­
forts was “to resist the blandishments of a Canada spUt along language lines.. .  to 
construct a society in which the minorities can expect to live much of their lives m 
their own language.”2
The official languages policy was complicated by the fact that it served two 
policy goals which were partially irreconcilable and two client groups that had 
conflicting objectives. The principal client group was Québécois, and the goal 
was to remedy the virtual exclusion of the French language from the Federal ad­
ministration.3 By addressing this question directly through language of work, lan­
guage of service and equitable participation goals, the 1969 policy attempted to 
appease the grievances of Québécois, attract their loyalties, and co-opt them away
‘Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa. I have been counsel for various language 
minorities in most of the major cases discussed in this article. I have advised most of the iraajot lan­
guage minorities on all aspects of languages policy, strategy, and law over a ten g "  period. 
some perceive that this creates a tilt in judgment, I indicate those cases here.
Language Education Rights and Education Act o f Ontario (Ont. GA.); Büodeauv. AÆ. Manitoba, 
[1986] 1 S.GR. 449; Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721; Co^  v- *.G. 
Quebec, [19831 C.S. 366 and Robin v. Le College de St-Bomface (Man.Q.B. and Man.CA.), Mac­
Donald v. City o f Montreal, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460; Mercure v. A.G. Saskatchewan (S.C.C); Singer v. A.G. 
Quebec, [1988] S.C.R. 790.
1R.S.C 1970, c. 0-2, as rep. by S.C 1988, c. 38.
2Commissioner of Official Languages, Annual Report, 1983, preface.
^The exclusion of French had been noted in the Report o f the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and 
Biculturalism, Vol. I, The Official Languages (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1967).
from nationalism by giving them an important stake in the federal government 
machinery.
The second client group of the 1969 policy was the official language 
minorities in the provinces, and the goal was to maintain, and in some cases, to 
resuscitate them. This was meant to have symbolic value in Quebec, for it drew a 
portrait of Canada where Québécois could inhabit communities in Canada 
beyond Quebec without feeling culturally and linguistically foreign - where larger 
Canada, then, offered Francophone Quebeckers something tangible, just as 
Quebec offered anglophones the possibility of moving there, and living and work­
ing in English.
These two goals came into conflict. Support for official language minorities 
meant support for the Anglo-Quebec community, since the 1969 policy created an 
equivalence between all official language minorities. This brought Ottawa into 
direct conflict with Quebec, for it was the goal of language planners in Quebec to 
restrict the English language in that province.4 The 1969 policy also brought Ot­
tawa into conflict with the provinces with anglophone majorities. Those provinces 
had significant, vocal, anti-bilingualism constituencies. When Manitoba tried to 
expand services for Franco-Manitobans in 1983, those constituencies created a 
political crisis which paralyzed the Manitoba Legislative Assembly and ended 
support for the New Democratic Party government. In short, enhancing minority 
rights did not impress, and to some extent offended Quebec; ignoring fran­
cophone minorities, especially during overheated periods, added rhetorical fuel to 
the nationalist fire.
Because the real purpose of Ottawa’s official languages policy was to address 
the threat coming from Quebec, Ottawa concentrated its efforts on providing 
tangible benefits to Quebeckers. This meant opening the federal public service to 
Québécois, and it was in this endeavour that Ottawa made the most progress. 
Writing in 1983, the Commissioner of Official Languages, who is a professional 
paid to complain about Canada’s linguistic woes, observed with justification that
For example, Bill 101, Charter o f the French Language, R.S.Q. c. C-ll, ss.58 and 69 prohibited the 
use of English (and languages other than French) on commercial signs and for firm names. Section
1 declares French to be the official language of Quebec. Sections 58 and 69 were invalidated in A G 
Quebec v. Chaussure Brown's Inc. and Singer v. A.G. Quebec, [1988] S.C.R. 234. To some extent 
Quebec was willing to make concessions to its anglophone minority based on reciprocal treatment 
for francophone minorities outside of Quebec. Premier Levesque offered the anglophone provinces 
accords de réciprocité” with respect to minority language instruction. See generally, J.E. Maenet 
“Minority Language Educational Rights” (1982) 4 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 195, 200. Both Ottawa and the 
provinces objected. Later Quebec took the view that provincial francophone minorities were past 
the point of no return, and were doomed. This view was expressed by many Quebec politicians, the 
most notable perhaps being the unfortunate statement made by Gerald Godin, Minister of Cultural 
Affairs and Minister responsible for Bill 101, in 1983 during the height of the Manitoba language 
rights crisis: See the interesting cartoon by Bado titled “Une cause perdue, dit Gerald Godin” in 
[Ottawa] Le Droit (20 September 1983).
sSee generally Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 721, where the history of 
these events is partially recounted.
“the linguistic face of the federal administration has been transformed.”6 Ot­
tawa’s support for provincial language minorities was somewhat symbolic. Ot­
tawa’s efforts never slowed demolition of Canada’s linguistic communities by the 
inexorable march of assimilation which eclipsed minorities by as much as eighty- 
eight per cent in some provinces.7 Francophone communities outside of Quebec 
as well as the Anglo-Quebec minority continued to decline in real nmnbers and as 
a percentage of total provincial population. Francophone communities outside of 
Quebec had no significant institutional infrastructure before the 1969 policy and 
this did not improve in the following years. Nevertheless, Ottawa did something 
in 1969, and the symbolic import, coupled with real changes in the Federal public 
sector, was considerable.
Ottawa’s symbolic currency converted to real value for official language 
minorities in ways unforseen by the 1969 policy. Parents in the provinces with 
anglophone majorities sent their children to immersion schools in record num­
bers, rising from 17,763 children in 1976-77 to 102,168 children in 1982-1983.® 
This brought the two language communities into contact with each other, result­
ing in a profound transformation of attitudes in English Canada - an increasing 
open-mindedness.9 Francophone minorities viewed the phenomenon as a mixed 
blessing. It was seen as an opportunity to replenish their declining ranks, and 
also, anxiously, as a new source of competition for economic opportunities which 
formerly had been open to them alone because of their bilingual ability.
Ottawa also made real and symbolic progress towards creating a coherent 
picture of Canadian linguistic duality during the Trudeau years. By the early 
1980’s this vision was reasonably well formed and was rooted in the Canadian 
consciousness. The portrait was associated with Prime Minister Trudeau; in 
political debate it was referred to as “Trudeau’s vision,”10 and entailed a Canada
6Ibid.
7Thc Adas des francophones de l’ouest (1979) at 20 reports that in British Columbia 88 per cent of 
francophones are assimilated; 72 per cent in Saskatchewan; 54 per cent in Manitoba. Between 1971 
and 1981 the anglo-Quebec community lost 158,000 people (20 per cent in real terms), declining 
from 15 per cent to 12.7 per cent of provincial population and expected to fall further to 10 per cent 
in the next ten years: J. Henripin, The English Speaking Population o f Quebec: A Demolinguistic 
Projection (Alliance Quebec, 1984) at 19.
®H.H. Stem, “The Immersion Phenomenon” (1984) 12 Language and Society 4,7. These numbers ex­
clude Quebec. Quebec prohibited the teaching of English to francophone students in the early 
elementary grades, resulting in increased unilingualism in that province.
9See generally, D. Cliff, ‘Towards the Larger Community” (1984) 12 Language and Society 65 at 66.
l0It is fair to associate his name with it, since the vision can be found throughout his writings, 
speeches and legislative priorities. For example, Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians 
(1968), at 32: “the Canadian community must invest, for the defence and better appreciation of the 
French language, as much time, energy, and money as are required to prevent the country from 
breaking up. . . this can be achieved by a constitutional amendment granting French minorities in 
other provinces, as well as in Ottawa, the same rights and privileges as the English minority in 
Quebec.” at 46: “The Fathers of Confederation showed great wisdom. . . while recognizing that 
French ra n a d ia n s  might always feel more at home in Quebec, they attempted to prevent the law 
from fostering in them a sense of inferiority or from giving them any excuse to feel like aliens in 
other parts of Canada... the Canadian constitution created a country where French Canadians could 
compete on an equal basis with English Canadians; both groups were invited to consider the whole
where citizens could live in many parts of the country in the language of their 
choice. Language planners call such phenomena “personal bilingualism,” mean­
ing that institutions of the state accommodate linguistic preferences of the indi­
vidual by providing service in the official language of the individual’s choice.11 
Mr. Trudeau’s vision helped to encourage official language, minorities by allowing 
for a small institutional network in the minority language. Where numbers war­
ranted, the Federal government created or induced the provinces to provide mi­
nority language schools, community institutions, political lobbies, government ser­
vices, public service employment opportunities, broadcasting and culture. Mr. 
Trudeau’s vision conceived of viable English and French communities throughout 
Canada. This goal was more or less well understood by the end of the Trudeau 
years. It commanded significant acceptance12 and, to some extent, this vision had 
been institutionalized in law, if not in reality, by the Patriation Reforms of 1982.
All of this activity, symbolic and real, made it seem as if Canada’s habit of 
neglecting official language minorities was coming to an end. By 1983 even the 
Official Languages Commissioner could report, uncharacteristically, that “there is 
reason for Canadians to share a certain pride about how far we have come;” that 
“there is no turning back;” and point to “a brighter linguistic future there for the 
taking.” Even if this was the bitter-sweet valedictory speech of a retiring official, 
still the remarks did indicate just how profoundly optimistic many Canadians had 
become about relations between the two langnagp. rom m ^nifjps
II
Ottawa’s actions and the resulting change in public attitudes impacted significant­
ly on the Supreme Court of Canada. The Court’s first look at official languages 
problems was in Jones v. A.G.N.B. .14 This was a reference to determine the 
validity of the federal Official Languages Act and certain New Brunswick legisla­
tion supporting the provincial Acadian minority. The Court upheld the legisla­
tion, justifying its result in the usual federalism “techno-talk.” However, with 
respect to language rights, Chief Justice Laskin was emphatic, describing lan­
guage rights as providing “specialprotection for linguistic minorités ”15
of Canada their country and field of endeavour.” The reasons why Trudeau perceived this vision as 
necessary are important. He writes at 31: “If French Canadians, and if their culture is established on 
a coast-to-coast basis, it is mainly because of the balance of linguistic forces within the country.. .  . 
In terms of realpolitik, French and English are equal in Canada because each of these linguistic 
groups has the power to break the countiy.”
J,E* Magnct’ ,,Thc Futurc of Official Language Minorities” (1986) 27 C  de D. 189, 
192 ff. where the language planning theory options are described.
^Thus, one reads the following editorial in the [Edmonton] Sun (7 October 1983): ‘The concept of 
Canada as a unilingual state is dead.. .  we have two official languages. . .  and every province will 
sooner or later have to meet its obligations to the Francophone minority.”
13Commissioner of Official Languages, Annual Report, 1983, preface.
14Jones v. A.G.N.B., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 182.
l5Ibid. at 193; (my emphasis).
In 1979, the anglophone minority of Quebec and the francophone minority of 
Manitoba appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada for special protection 
against hostile provincial governments. The Anglo-Quebec minority sought spe­
cial protection against secs. 7-13 of Bill 10116 which purported to abolish English 
as a language of the legislature and courts, contrary to s. 133 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867. The Franco-Manitoban situation was bizarre. By a provincial enact­
ment of 1890,17 Manitoba attempted to abrogate French as a language of the 
legislature and courts, contrary to s.23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870. Despite three 
lower court rulings18 that the 1890 statute was invalid, Manitoba refused to 
respond. The Attorney General of Manitoba stated after the 1976 court ruling: 
“The Crown does not accept the ruling of the court with respect to the con­
stitutionality of the Official Language Act." This prompted the Chief Justice of 
Manitoba to note: “A more arrogant abuse of authority I have yet to en­
counter.”19 Nevertheless, the Manitoba Legislature and Government continued to 
ignore the Court’s ruling in that the illegal 1890 Act remained on the Manitoba 
statute books, and continued to be observed by the Province.
The Supreme Court reacted firmly with tough remedial protection, and tough 
talk to both provinces.20 Building on the “special protection” language of Jones, 
the Court made clear that s.133 was an entrenched provision, tolerating no 
unilateral contraction of the protections therein declared. The Court then ex­
panded s.133’s protections beyond the express language of the text. “Section 
133,” said the Court, “ought to be considered broadly.” It should not be read 
“overly-technical.” Section 133 contained a principle “of growth,” and on that 
principle the Court augmented s.133 beyond its express terms to subject a wide 
spectrum of institutions and statutory materials to the discipline of official 
bilingualism. As a final slap at Quebec, the Court noted that Quebec itself had 
taken an “enlarged appreciation” of the meaning of “Courts of Quebec” in 
stipulating for m^ilingiialism therein. The Court rubbed Quebec s nose in this, 
holding that the bilingualism rule of s.133 would fasten throughout the range of 
institutions captured by Quebec’s “enlarged appreciation.”21
With respect to Manitoba, the Court was cold: the 1890 statute was invalid - 
period! T h e  Court said not a word regarding the consequences. This left the im­
pression that all Manitoba statutes since 1890 were void, as being in “flagrant 
contradiction” with constitutional requirements. The Court’s studied silence 
brooded ominously in the Manitoba constitutional landscape,22 dominating
^Charter of the French Language, S.Q. 1977, c. 5.
17Official Language Act, S.M. 1890, c. 14.
l*Pellant v. Hebert, (1892), [1981] 12 R.G.D. 242; Bertrand v. Dussault, (1909), [1977] 77 D.L.R. (3d) 
445,448; R  v. Forest, [1976], 74 D.L.R. (3d) 704.
19See [1977] 77 D.L.R. (3d) 445,458.
xA.G. Manitoba v. Forest, [1979] 2 S.GR. 1032;A.G. Quebec v. Blaikie, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1032.
21A.G. Quebec v. Blaikie, [1979] 2 S.GR. 1016,1028-30.
22See J.E. Magnet, “Validity of Manitoba Laws After Forest' (1980) 10 Man. LJ. 241 for a con­
temporaneous assessment of the legal consequences occasioned by the Supreme Court’s ruling.
Manitoba politics for the next five years, and setting the Manitoba Legislature on 
a perilous collision course with constitutional imperatives.
In 1980, a rehearing in the Quebec case was ordered at the instance of 
Quebec to clarify the extent of government documents caught by the Court’s 
ruling that regulations must be bilingual. The Court continued to apply an ex­
panding interpretation to s.133,23 to subject regulations made by the government 
to bilingualism, as well as government decrees which altered regulations made by 
a subordinate agency. Also, the expanding interpretation approach was combined 
with the special protection language of Jones to support a holding that Court 
rules of practice had to be bilingual. The Court’s statement on this issue is inter­
esting because it suggests a functional approach predicated on protecting the 
position of linguistic minorities in majoritarian institutions.24
In the Manitoba Language Rights Reference25 the Supreme Court gave new 
life to official bilingualism through a robust, expanding, purposeful interpretation 
of constitutional guarantees. The Court used impressive rhetoric: “The purpose 
of [constitutional guarantees for official bilingualism],” the Court stated, “was to 
ensure full and equal access to the legislatures, the laws and the courts for fran­
cophones and anglophones alike.” Those guarantees “are obligatory. They must 
be observed. . . .” Failure to do so “leads to . . . invalidity.”26 The Court ex­
plained its previous ruling in BlaiJde I  from the perspective of full and equal ac­
cess for the minority. Blaikie I  requires equal authority and status for English 
and French because “[njothing less would adequately.. .  insure that the law was 
equally accessible to francophones and anglophones alike.”27 Most interesting 
was the court’s development of its “special protection” doctrine first instituted in 
Jones. The Court went beyond special protection, to read constitutional guaran­
tees for official bilingualism “purposive[ly] ,”28 finding in them “a specific 
manifestation of the general right of Fran co-Manitobans to use their own lan­
guage,” and imposing upon the judiciary “the responsibility of protecting the cor­
relative language rights of. . . the Franco-Manitoban minority.”29 In short, the 
Court had found in the terse phrasing of ancient constitutional texts a system of
23(<fr,
Tne requirements of s.133 of the B.NA. Act would be truncated, as was said by this Court [in 
Blaikie I\ at p. 1027 of its reasons, should this section be construed so as not to govern [regulations 
made by the government];” Blaikie //, [1981] 1 S.GR. 312 at 321.
All litigants have the fundamental right to choose either French or English and would be deprived 
of this freedom of choice should such rules and compulsory forms be couched in one language onlv:” 
Blaikie II, at 332.
^[1985] 1 S.GR. 721. This Reference was occasioned by the failure of Manitoba politics to resolve 
the constitutional difficulties posed by the 1979 Forest case. A Manitoba francophone forced the is­
sue by challenging the validity of two unilingual Manitoba statutes in a Highway Traffic Act prosecu­
tion. At the request of the Société Franco Manitobaine, the Federal government referred the issue 
to the Supreme Court directly.
^Ibid. at 739-40,746-7.
21 Ibid. at 776.
™Ibid. at 751.
^Ibid. at 744-5.
minority protections.30 Through a purposive, expanding, dynamic interpretation, 
the Court set out to reconstruct these special protections so to ensure full and 
equal access for the minority, in a meaningful way, to the range of governmental 
institutions to which they applied.
Ill
Had Ottawa acted consistently and persevered, the new openness created a sub­
stantial possibility that Mr. Trudeau’s vision could have been implemented in in­
stitutional reality.31 But Ottawa did not act consistently. Ottawa lacked steady 
resolve. Its reaction was often incomprehensible, contradictory and fickle. Ot­
tawa was even, too often, an aggressive advocate against linguistic minorities. 
The Official Languages Commissioner noted Ottawa’s curious conduct repeatedly 
in his Reports, illustrating the problem with incident after incident.32
Some egregious examples of cracked federal behaviour may assist to ap­
preciate how damaging was Ottawa’s demeanour to official languages policy. In 
1978, as part of suggested constitutional reform, Ottawa proposed, without even 
consulting the Franco-Manitoban minority, to abolish constitutionally guaranteed 
official bilingualism in Manitoba.33 Broadcasting regulators and the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation consistently refused to provide programming relating 
to local minority communities, seemingly oblivious to the fact that francophones 
in St-Boniface are not interested in strikes at Laval University. They are inter­
ested in strikes at St-Boniface College for which they have to switch to program­
ming in English, contributing to their anglicization and assimilation. Op­
portunistic federal politicians declared themselves willing to sacrifice linguistic 
minorities in exchange for anti-bilingualism votes in western Canada. The most 
spectacular example of this was a statement by John Turner at his opening press 
conference during the 1984 Federal Liberal leadership campaign. Governmental 
services for linguistic minorities, Mr. Turner said, were a provincial matter, and 
must be negotiated with the province. Since the statement was made at the
30A “systems theory” is more fully developed in J.E. Magnet, “The System of Official Bilingualism” 
(1986) 18 Ott. L. Rev. 227.
31“Determined governments can counterweight the principal forces causing declining numbers in of­
ficial language communities. Economic development, language of work, language of education, and 
language of media are phenomena on which governments can and do impact profoundly...  . The 
development of our official language minorities is something that lies in our power as a pohtual 
community to control.” See J.E. Magnet, “The Future of Official Language Minorities” (1986) 27 C. 
de D. 189 at 194.
32For example, see Commissioner of Official Languages, Annual Report (1982) at 5: "Three things 
seem to be lacking from the federal image of linguistic leadership: consistency, imagination and sub­
tlety. . .  . Propounding a single, more harmonious vision of what Canada can reasonably aim for... 
is a much more worthwhile endeavour than pursuing a variety of fragmented and often incompatible 
causes.”
^Canada, The Constitutional Amendment Bill: Text and Explanatory Notes [Bill C-60], June, 1978, 
s.l31(4)(d).
^See Federation of Francophones Outside of Quebec, The Heirs o f Lord Durham: Manifesto o f a 
Vanishing People (1978) at 60.
height of the Manitoba language rights crisis, it was interpreted, as intended,35 to 
signify weakening federal support for bilingualism, with more respect being paid 
to red-neck anti-bilingual sentiment activated by the overheated Manitoba events.
The most inexplicable, and the most damaging of all Ottawa’s behaviour, was 
the posture Ottawa adopted in Court. At first, the Federal positions in official 
languages litigation seemed merely incompetent. In its initial factum in Bilodeau 
the Justice Department embraced the strange suggestion that all Manitoba 
statutes prior to 1979 were valid by the doctrine of necessity. This position would 
have resulted in a pro tanto repeal of official bilingualism Protracted lobbying by 
the Société Franco Manitobaine succeeded in having Ottawa’s factum withdrawn, 
and a special counsel appointed for the government. The next Federal factum at­
tacked the Franco-Manitoban position directly. The Manitoba Language Rights 
Reference became a contest between the Franco-Manitobans and Canada,36 
Manitoba being without a viable position.
Another strange factum in the Ontario Educational Rights Reference37 pro­
duced complaints from the Association canadienne française de l’Ontario. Ot­
tawa responded by submitting supplementary notes. In key cases in Manitoba38 
and Quebec* designed to inflate the court clause and records and journals clause 
of official bilingualism guarantees the Department of Justice sent only observers, 
who took no position at all. Finally, in the MacDonald case, Ottawa showed its 
true cracked colours. MacDonald's case sought an expansion of the court clause 
in s.133, an action supported by the Official Languages Commissioner, who 
“hope[d], by considered and effective involvement, to help achieve the most gen­
erous settlement possible in th[is] case.”40 What did Ottawa say in its factum? 
“A broad and generous interpretation [of language rights],” Ottawa maintained.
“ “Turner Supporters Nervous Over French Rights Stand” [Toronto] Globe and Mail (20 March
1984) at 1.
^In the period between Justice’s two factums, the situation had changed dramatically. The Franco- 
Manitoban constitutional claim became a negotiating chip in three way talks between Manitoba, 
Canada and the Société Franco Manitobaine. These talks were for the purpose of changing 
Manitoba's obligations to translate a large quantity of useless statutes and records for constitutional 
commitments to construct a viable infrastructure of French language rights to support the Franco- 
Manitoban community. Although the talks ultimately bore fruit in an agreement to amend the Con- 
stitution of Canada, the necessary resolution from the Manitoba Legislative Assembly stalled be­
cause of a quirk in that Assembly’s procedures. The Franco-Manitoban Court position, if successful, 
would have backed the Manitoba government into a corner from which the only escape would have 
been to reintroduce the failed resolution into the Assembly, the Assembly’s procedures having by 
then been amended to remove the obstacle to passage of the first resolution. Franco-Manitobans 
recognized bilingual statutes as virtually useless to their continued existence. Canada’s position, 
which the Court accepted, sought statute translation on a timetable - a conclusion that was a pyrrhic 
victory for the Franco-Manitoban minority.
^Reference re Minority Language Educational Rights (1984), 10 D.L.R. (4th) 491 (Ont.GA.).
^Robin v. Le College de St-Boniface (1984), 15 D.L.R. (4th) 198 (Man.GA.).
*A.G. Quebec v. Collier, Que. CA. (Mtl.) Sept. 19,1985, no. 500-36-000189-830.
^Commissioner of Official Languages, Annual Report (1985) at 16.
“cannot be used.”41 This curious position provoked opposition members to ques­
tion the Prime Minister about the matter in the House. The opposition asked 
that Canada's factum be withdrawn. Ottawa refused to withdraw its factum. Ot­
tawa got everything it asked for in this case, bringing language rights development 
to an end in the Courts.
Anyone who practices before the Supreme Court or intimately observes its 
proceedings knows that the Attorney General of Canada is not a litigant like 
others. In disputes having sensitive political ramifications, Canada’s position 
counts for more than others. It is not coincidental that Canada got virtually 
everything it asked the Court for in these cases - including the restrictive ap­
proach to l^ngiiagft rights contended for in MacDonald. The Court  ^knows that 
Ottawa has special responsibility to solve political problems resulting from its 
opinions. That is why the Court sometimes acknowledges the political sensitivity 
of the contest in its written opinion.42 Accordingly, as appears from the results in 
such cases, Ottawa’s litigating positions count for a great deal; they are an impor­
tant instrument in the public policy process. This ought to give Ottawa an 
aroused sense of respect for official languages policy when its litigating positions 
are developed. It is a sensitivity that Ottawa lacked completely in the language 
cases litigated in the 1980s.
In the spring of 1984 Prime Minister Trudeau left office. The language 
minorities sensed that an era had passed. The Manitoba language controversy 
had badly frightened them, sapping their morale. Given that Mr. Turner had util­
ized weakened support for bilingualism as part of his political campaign, the con­
temporaneous Manitoba language tumult which collapsed political support for 
the Manitoba government, the defeatof the Liberal party federally, an4 the 
strong anti-bilingualism elements in the incoming Tory caucus, the unease of the 
language communities was understandable. In fact, the high water mark of the 
language, communities - which was not all that high - was receding in history.
IV
Members of the Supreme Court of Canada must have found Canadian constitu­
tional processes deeply troubling following patriation in 1982. The nationalist 
government in Quebec City simmered in barely controlled rage over its constitu­
tional defeat. Quebec determined to opt out of Canada’s constitutional pro­
cesses. Quebec boycotted the four first ministers meetings on constitutional mat­
ters held after 1982.43 Quebec’s Bill 62 opted out of the Charter o f Rights
41MacDonald v. City o f Montreal, [1986] 1 S.GR. 460, Factum of the Attorney General of Canada at
10.
42Manitoba Language Rights Reference, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721,728: ‘This Reference combines legal and 
constitutional questions of the utmost subtlety and complexity with political questions of great 
sensitivity.”
43Constitution Act, 1982, secs.37, 37.1 required a first ministers meeting in 1983, and two additional 
meetings before 1987. In addition, a political accord signed in 1983 required another first ministère 
conference in 1984. In all, 4 first ministers conferences were held under these provisions, m 1983, 4, 
5 and 1987.
wholesale. Quebec’s intention, stormed Premier Levesque, was “to make it . . .  as 
difficult as we can for some aspects of that bloody Charter to be applied” to 
Quebec.44
Quebec’s isolation was not attributable alone to the Parti Québécois. The 
Quebec Liberals, in opposition, voted with the Parti Québécois to condemn the 
patriation reforms. In government, the Quebec Liberals thundered in their own 
way. “No Quebec government, regardless of its political tendencies, could sign 
the Constitution Act, 1982 in its present form,” threatened Mr. Rémillard, who 
warned that “Quebec’s isolation cannot continue much longer without jeopardiz­
ing the very foundations of true federalism.”45 Language rights were an impor­
tant constitutional axis around which Quebec’s grievances orbited.46 In these cir­
cumstances it is understandable that the Supreme Court might be re-thinking its 
imposition of a language rights system on the provinces by its aggressive, dynamic 
interpretation of the old constitutional texts.
The sensitivity of the language issue continued after the defeat of the Parti 
Québécois in 1985. Mr. Bourassa, for the Quebec Liberals, had campaigned to 
soften Bill 101, particularly the requirement that commercial signs be solely in 
French.47 After his election, Bourassa found it inopportune to deliver on that 
promise.
44An Act Respecting the Constitution Act, 1982, S.Q. 1982, c. 21. Premier Levesque’s remarks are 
cited in Gibson, The Law o f the Charter (1986) at 126.
^Gil Rémillard [Quebec Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs], “Nothing Less than Quebec’s Dig­
nity is at Stake in Future Constitutional Discussions,” Speech given at Mont-Gabriel at a Conference 
organized by the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1985. This speech set out Quebec’s five 
demands. These became the basis of the Edmonton Declaration, a communique issued by the first 
ministers following their agreement at a conference in Edmonton, in which first ministers agreed to 
Quebec’s five points as the basis for their discussions. It is this process, and the subsequent discus­
sions, which resulted in the Meech Lake Accord.
46The reforms of 1982 were in part aimed at Quebec’s language legislation, and had immediate in­
validating effect on the language of instruction provisions of Bill 101. “It is therefore not surprising 
that Bill 101 was very much in the minds of the framers of the Constitution when they enacted s.23 
of the Charter. . .  . By incorporating into the structure of s.23 of the Charter the unique set of 
criteria in s.73 of Bill 101, the framers of the Constitution identified the type of regime they wished 
to correct... the provisions of s.73 of Bill 101 collide directly with those of s.23 of the Charter...
A.G. Quebec v. P,S.G.BM ., [1984] 2 S.C.R 66. The Canadian Charter also threatened secs. 52,53,57, 
58-61 and 69 of Bill 101. These were challenged in A.G. Quebec v. Chaussure Brown [1988] 2 S.C.R 
12 and Singer v. A.G. Quebec. Sections 58 and 69 were invalidated. The PQ Government of Quebec 
identified “Quebec’s Responsibility for Ungauge Rights” as a major grievance needing constitu­
tional redress in its Draft Agreement on the Constitution: Proposals by the Government o f Quebec (May
1985). Mastering Our Future, The Program o f the Quebec Liberal Party (February 1985) also addressed 
Quebec’s language concerns (at 56-60), although this was not made one of the five conditions neces­
sary to allow Quebec to “sign” the Patriation Bill.
41Charter o f the French Language, R.S.Q. c. c-11, s38 requires that “signs and posters and commer­
cial advertising shall be solely in the official language” [The official language is French by s.l]. Sec­
tion 69 requires French only for firm names. These were invalidated in Chaussure Brown v. A.G. 
Quebec and Singer v. A.G. Quebec.
Mr Bourassa initiated intensive consultations with federal and provincial 
leaders to search for a formula that would allow Quebec to re-enter the Canadian 
constitutional family. In a speech given at Mont-Gabriel, Quebec s Inter­
governmental Affairs Minister, Gil Rémillard, stipulated five conditions, that 
could “persuade Quebec to support the Constitution Act of 1982. Toward the 
end of his speech, Mr. Rémillard referred to a sixth Quebec objective - improv­
ing the situation of Francophones living outside the Province of Quebec.^ Mr. 
Rémillard suggested improving s.23 of the Charter, and noted that this could 
only benefit Quebec’s anglophone minority.”
Significantly, Mr. Rémillard’s objective to assist language minorities was 
omitted from the Edmonton Declaration, a First Minister’s communiqué stating 
the five points upon which First ministers agreed to discuss reintegration of 
Quebec through constitutional amendment. The failure to include francophones 
outside of Quebec is significant because it indicates the Premiers’ negative atti­
tude towards improving the language rights situation.
The talks following the Edmonton Declaration resulted in the Meech Lake 
Constitutional Accord of 1987. The Meech Lake Accord sent the Supreme Court 
an additional language rights signal. The Accord would diminish the already 
fragile status of francophones outside of Quebec. The distinct society clause 
hurts Francophones outside of Quebec because “[a]n important, but unsaid, im­
plication of this proposition is that the rest of Canada is also a distinct society and 
that the governments of that society have the responsibility of preserving and 
promoting its distinct identity.”49 At least one provincial Premier has already 
used Meech Lake in this sense, as a rhetorical weapon, to justify taking away the 
historic language rights of francophones outside of Quebec. Mr. Getty, tne 
Premier of Alberta, explained why the government of Alberta was repealing 
French rights under s.110 of the North-west Territories Act by saying that he was 
standing up for the people of Alberta in the “distinct society” that existed there:
this is a matter of the government representing the people of Alberta in the dis­
tinct society that we have in this province. . . 50
««Section 2fl)(a) declares that “the existence of French-speaking Canadians. . .  present elsewhere 
[than Quebecl in Canada, and English-speaking Canadians.. .  also present in Quebec, constitutes a 
fundamental characteristic of Canada.” Section 2(l)(b) declares that “Quebec constitute within 
Canada a distinct society.” Section 2(3) affirms a role for the legislature and 
to preserve and promote the “distinct identity of Quebec.” Section 2(4) provides that the section 
does not derogate from the “powers, rights or privileges” of the legislatures of governments ofCan- 
ada or the provinces. The “minimalist interpretation” is the product of the Supreme Court s work n 
^ ^ T ^ o f M o n Z ,  [1986J 1 S^R . 460 and SJLNJB. v. Asm.
Education, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549: (kmgauge rights are “incomplete.. .  a constitutional minimum, 
MacDonald at 496).
49R Breton, “The Concepts of ‘Distinct Society1 and ‘Identity* in the Meech Lake Accord, in 
Swinton and Rogerson (eds.), Competing Constitutional Visions (1988) at 5.
xAlberta Hansard (23 June 1988) at 1964. This had been foreseen by Bryan Schwartz, Fathoming 
Meech Lake (Winnipeg: LRI of University of Manitoba, 1987) at 38, who wrote: In the 
other than Quebec] the Quebec clause may be read, even if misread, as mandating a Canada in 
which most non-Quebeckers speak English, and only English.”
The duality clauses of the Meech Lake Accord describe Quebec as a “society.” 
By contrast, francophones outside of Quebec are described as a “population/’ 
that is, as “also present elsewhere in Canada.”51 The contrast is important. The 
legal sources underlying “society” imply an institutional structure through which a 
community is formed, organized and can act. This differs from “population” 
which refers to an aggregate of people without such an institutional structure.52
The chief problem faced by francophones outside of Quebec is their lack of 
an adequate institutional structure. Without developing an institutional infra­
structure, francophones outside of Quebec rightly perceive that they cannot sur­
vive. The difficulty with Meech Lake is that it conceives of francophones outside 
of Quebec without an institutional base. When Meech Lake talks about provinces 
preserving francophones outside of Quebec, it uses the language of preserving the 
“population” - ie., the French speaking Canadians without any institutional struc­
ture. It does not talk about preserving the “society,” as it does in the case of 
Quebec.
It is difficult to read the duality clauses as requiring provinces to transform 
language minority “populations” into “societies” - into organized communities 
which can act through institutions. However, it is easy to read the duality clauses 
as requiring provinces to preserve minority language “populations,” and minority 
language “populations” only. On this interpretation, Meech Lake means that 
francophones outside of Quebec should never become “societies” - that they be 
“preserved” as “populations,” scattered aggregates of persons without org a n ic  
institutions.
Further, the duality clauses of the Meech Lake Accord contain a contrast be­
tween the work “preserve” (s.2-2) and the words “preserve and promote” (s.2- 
3). Quebec has a role to “preserve and promote” its distinct identity, other pro­
vinces have a role to “preserve” the presence of French speakers. This language 
is non-justidable; it must be interpreted by Canada and the provinces. The lan­
guage suggests that provinces merely maintain the presence of french speakers; it 
does not suggest that provinces must take active steps to promote the vitality of 
minority language communities. This contrast between “preserve” and 
“promote” encourages the perception that Quebec is the real homeland of fran­
5X Constitutional Accord, 1987, Section 2(lXa).
52The contrast between a society and a population is foreshadowed in the Report o f the Royal Com­
mission on Bilmguatism and Bilculturalism [the B&B Report], The preliminary report of the B&B 
Commission, at 103 designated the existence of Quebec; “[de] formes d’organisation et [d’l institu­
tions qu une population assez nombreuse, animée par la meme culture, s’est donnée et a reçues, 
dont elle dispose librement sur un territoire assez vast et ou elle vit de façon homogene, selon des 
norme» et des regies de conduite qui lui sont communes.” The importance of this passage is its con­
firmation that the concept of society includes an institutional infrastructure. A population, by con­
trast, does not.
S3The Federation des Francophones Hors Quebec notes this also: Proceedings o f Special Joint Com­
mittee on the Constitutional Accord, 1987,3:6.
cophones; those outside of Quebec are of secondary significance. In conclusior^ 
the duality clauses suggest an unflattering constitutional portrait °f Jan^iage 
minorities. This unattractive picture could infect interpretation of constitutional 
guarantees which language minorities already enjoy.
Section 13 of the Meech Lake Accord provides for annual first ministers con­
ferences on the Constitution. If francophones outside of Quebec are to make 
constitutional progress, they must progress at one of these 
an issue get on the agenda of the constitutional conferences? Section 13 of the 
Meech Lake Accord includes certain mandatory agendai items. F^cophones 
outside of Quebec are not included. Section 50(2)(c) of the Meech 
provides that the conferences shall have included on their agenda such other 
matters as are agreed on.” Presumably this means unanimous agreement of the 
Federal government and all provinces, since that is the formula that was used to 
strike the Meech Lake deal. Thus, Alberta, Saskatchewan British Columbia, or 
any single province for that matter, could veto inclusion of francophones outside 
of Quebec on the agenda. Although Federal and Quebec Ministers promised 
that francophones outside of Quebec would be on the agenda, ‘^ ^ t e r s  can­
not deliver on their promise if any provincial premier objects. This is a net loss 
for language minorities because unanimity has not been required previously to 
get them on the agenda for constitutional reform.
Senate reform is on the agenda for the forthcoming constitutional confer­
ences. The MacDonald Royal Commission suggested that bills having hnguistic 
c;inrnifiranri». be subject to approval of a double majority m the Senate, a majority 
of all Senators and a majority of francophone Senators, a suggestion which, if not 
ideal at least is an improvement for francophones outside of Quebec. T 
proposal for linguistic rights may or may not be discussed when Senate reform is 
addressed around the constitutional table. The problem is that francophone 
minorities are not required to be invited to discuss it and they hfve no obvious 
proxy around the table to advance their views. Thus, an issue crucial to their con­
stitutional development may be decided m their absence, or ig n o r e d  entirely. The 
decision makers will be the provincial premiers, a group
eressively pursuing the interests of francophone minorities. This results m 
diminished expectations that this issue will be resolved favorably to the mterests 
of linguistic minorities.
Section 16 of the Meech Lake Accord shields aboriginal and multicultunü 
rights from any damaging effect that might be worked by the duality dauses. The 
well know maxim inclusio unius, est exelusio alterius may mean that official lan- 
guage rights are not shielded from any damapng effects that the duahtydaases 
S ^w orfc55 Sections 2(l)(b) and 2(3) of Meech L a k e  can be read as dedanng, in
54— mmnanion resolution aereed to on 9 June 1990 would overcome this objection. Section 5(1)
of the Companion Resolution adds “matters of interest to English-speaking and French-speaking 
linguistic minorities’' to the agenda of the first minister’s conferences.
55q__ ^n-raiiv S A  Scott “Meech Lake and Quebec Society,” in R. Forest (ed.), L ’adheston du 
Quebec a Vaccord du Lac Meech (1988) at 48: ‘The inference is both clear and inevitable that if 
S ta in  sections of the Canadian Charter are specifically protected from the operation of s.2 [
effect, that legislative objectives connected to Quebec’s distinct society justify 
violating official language rights, even where not demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society. This could impact negatively on francophones outside 
Quebec since, as noted^ above, the duality clauses may portray them in a homely 
constitutional light. This offers the interpretative potential to dilute existing con­
stitutional guarantees linguistic minorities now enjoy.
In sum, Meech Lake concocts an unattractive portrait of linguistic minorities, 
at odds with the historic aspirations of these communities. Courts or premiers 
can use that image to diminish existing constitutional protections now enjoyed. 
Meech Lake gives each provincial premier a veto against francophone minorities 
ever again coming onto the constitutional reform agenda. It places the important 
Senate reform issue on the agenda without giving francophone minorities any as­
surance of participation. Most importantly, Meech Lake gives provincial 
premiers a rhetorical weapon against linguistic minorities; a means of refusing to 
develop an institutional network to support francophones outside of Quebec, and 
to contract existing institutional structures guaranteed by existing constitutional 
language rights. One provincial premier has already used Meech Lake in this 
way. Meech Lake must be considered a further bizarre illustration of the con­
tracting constitutional importance of the language minorities.
V
Ottawa’s inconstancy on official languages policy, particularly its urging Gf a 
restricted reading of constitutional language rights in court, and the scary con­
stitutional processes after 1982, impressed the Supreme Court of Canada. The 
Manitoba Language Rights Reference was the high water mark of language rights 
developments. After 1985, the Court did an abrupt about-face, bdngimwifflmr 
any longer, to challenge Quebec. The expanding and dynamic reading of con­
stitutional language rights came to a curt halt. The Court withdrew from serious 
constitutional review of language controversies.
C  ^ £ hj S haPPened unequivocally in MacDonald v. City o f M ontrea l and 
XA.N.B. v. Association o f Parents for Fairness in Education r  In MacDonald, the 
Supreme Court agreed with Canada’s submission that “a broad and generous in­
terpretation of language rights cannot be used.” The Court described constitu­
tional language rights as “a constitutional minimum.” “It is not open to the 
courts, under the guise of interpretation, to improve upon, supplement or amend 
this historical constitutional compromise.” This approach required strange rea­
soning and lead to perverse results. While the speaker has the right in par­
liamentary debates or in court to choose the language of address, “this does not 
guarantee that the speaker. . .  will be understood in the language of choice by 
those he is addressing.”58 This odd statement led Madame Justice Wilson to con­
Mcech Lake] and others not, the latter are more vulnerable.”
1986] 1 S.C.R. 460.
^[1986] 1 S.C.R. 549.
58MacDonald, at 496.
demn the result in dissent as falling “so short of [the s.133 language] right as to 
effectively undermine it;”* Chief Justice Dickson, in dissent, to castigate the out­
come with a question: “What good is a right to use one’s language if those to 
whom one speaks cannot understand?”60 and the commentators to rebuke the 
Court for reasoning which made language rights “Hollow.”61 Nevertheless, the 
Court was on a new, decisive path. The reason why, explained by the majority in 
SA.N.B., was that developments in the language rights area were to be left to the 
provinces.62
If this is the real reason, the Court would seem to have travelled to the other 
side of the reality principle. The provinces are not in the mood - and never have 
been in the mood in Canadian history - to advance language rights. Canadian his­
tory is a history of bitter, dangerous conflict fought over language rights as a 
result of stingy, vindictive aggression by provincial majorities. It is a dangerous 
history, resulting in federal provincial conflict, heightened tension between Ot­
tawa and Quebec, sullen brooding in French Canada, suspicion, hostility, growth 
of nationalism in Canada’s regions, particularly Quebec. The Manitoba School 
crisis, Regulation 17, Penetanguishene, Gens de l’air, Bill 101, the Manitoba Lan­
guage Rights Crisis - these bitter language wars threaten to tear Canada apart at 
the seams. Canada’s political system cannot control these pathological crises. 
Each new conflict threatens the security of this country. That is why they are 
given to the courts. Courts are expected to channel political conflict into legal 
procedure, and to enforce a consistent bright line.
In S-A.N.B. and MacDonald, the Court dealt a crippling blow to two 
minorities in particular. Although the right to a judge who understands the mi­
nority language directly, without interpretation, was not controversial in New 
Brunswick where the SA.N.B. case was litigated, it caused immediate problems 
in Manitoba. Since before formation of the Province of Manitoba, the Queen’s 
Bench had always had at least one French speaking judge able to preside over 
French proceedings.63 At the height of the Manitoba language rights crisis m
*Ibid. at 543. 
x Ibid. at 566.
61(Toionto] Globe and Mail (7 May 1986) at A6.
a SA.N.B., p. 579: The Charter reflected “a principle of advancement or progress in the equality of 
status or use of the two official languages...  this principle of advancement is linked with the legisla­
tive process... . The legislative process, unlike the judicial one, is a political process and hence par­
ticularly suited to the advancement of rights.. .  . If the provinces were told that [constitutional lan­
guage rights were] inherently dynamic and progressive.. .  and that the speed of progress was to be 
controlled mainly by the courts, they would have no means to know with relative precision what it 
was that they were opting into. This would certainly increase their hesitation in [advancing language 
rights].”
«This was required by provincial legislation both before, and immediately after, Manitoba joined 
confederation in 1870: see Minutes o f the CouncU ofAssiniboia, (31 May 1849) which resolved that 
judges of the General Court should address the court in both the French and English languages 
(reproduced in Oliver, The Canadian Northwest: Its Early Development and Legislative Records 
(1914) at 352). This was received as law into the post-confederation Province of Manitoba by The 
Supreme Court Act, S.M. 1871, cap. 2, s.52. In 1872, the Manitoba Legislature provided: ’’No person 
shaU be appointed under this Act as Chief Justice or Puisne Justice or Prothonotary of the Court of 
Queen’s Bench unless such person is able to speak both the English and French languages: “An Act
1984, the Manitoba Queen’s Bench, for the first time in Manitoba’s history, as­
signed an English speaking judge, working with an interpreter, to a French pro­
ceeding.64 A constitutional challenge to Manitobia’s failure to assign a French- 
speaking judge to the case failed in the Manitoba Courts, producing a stinging 
dissent from French speaking Chief Justice Alfred Monnin. After SA.N.B. the 
result was a foregone conclusion. The Supreme Court of Canada did not even 
grant leave.65 This collapsed a right which Franco-Manitobans enjoyed since be­
fore Confederation.66 So too, the Anglo-Quebec minority had been summoned 
before the courts of Montreal in English or bilingual ly for more than two hun­
dred years.67 MacDonald vaporized this right. MacDonald gave Quebec the 
power, which Montreal newly exercised, to summon anglophones before the 
courts of Quebec in French only.
The misguidedness of the Supreme Court’s new approach of leaving language 
controversies as much as possible to provincial politics became apparent almost 
immediately in Father André Mercure’s case.68 In this case the Court surprisingly 
heard the appeal of a speeding motorist, even though the motorist had died, in 
order to bring before it the substantial issue raised: whether Saskatchewan is offi­
cially bilingual.
The Court’s judgment is highly technical and arcane, a curiosity walk-through 
the ancient statutes by which Saskatchewan became a Canadian province. Vir­
tually all constitutional lawyers would agree that the Court plausibly could have 
interpreted the old statutes to say that French is gone in Saskatchewan. Most 
would agree too that the old statutes could be read to say that French survives in 
Saskatchewan under constitutional protection in the sense that Saskatchewan can­
not diminish it.69 Equally credible, the Court could have read the old statutes to
to Amend An Act to Establish A Supreme Court in the Province o f Manitoba,” S.M. 1872, cap. 3, sec. 5.
“Robin v. College de St. Boniface [1984] 1 W.W.R. 271; affd., [1985] 1 W.W.R. 249 (Man. GA.) was a 
wrongful dismissal action where the first language of the plaintiff was French, the working language 
of the defendant institution was French, the employment contract was in French, the pleadings were 
in French, all correspondence between the parties was in French, the first language of the witnesses 
was French, examinations for discovery were conducted in French, and the first tanmmo». of the law­
yers for both parties was French.
^[1986] 1 S.GR. p. xiii.
Government of New Brunswick, Toward Equality o f Official Languages in New Brunswick (Report 
of the Task Force on Official Languages, 1982) at 661: It goes without saying that if the judge, in a 
trial proceeding, requires interpretation for his or her convenience most, if not all, lawyers will use 
the majority language. The wait for inteipretation during cross examination of witnesses forfeits too 
much. Inteipretation reduces the opportunity to impress judges with the complex psychological as­
sessments produced by the spoken language. Government studies have already concluded that inter­
pretation makes cross examination ‘Virtually impossible,” and that inteipretation “in a profession of 
words... is unacceptable.”
**rhe history is set out in my factum (for the Société Franco Manitobaine) in the Supreme Court of 
Canada in MacDonald’s case, copies of which are on file in the Supreme Court.
‘“S.C.G Feb. 25,1988.
6*This would have obliged Saskatchewan to implement official bilingualism in the shortest possible 
time.
preserve French in Saskatchewan, but without constitutional protection. In strict 
law no one of these conclusions is more compelling than any other. The result, 
therefore, is based on the Courts constitutional policy, albeit disguised m the 
techno-talk of statutory interpretation.
The Court ruled that French survives in Saskatchewan, but without constitu­
tional protection. Presumably, under the Court’s new policy that language rights 
should be left to provincial politics, this ruling invited the Saskatchewan legisla­
ture to advance language rights by making an appropriate deal with the Franc- 
Saskois. That was thoughtful. However, the Court should have realized that its 
ruling also invited the Saskatchewan legislature to abolish French.
The Court’s judgment set Canada off on another serious round of language 
pathology. Predictably, Saskatchewan abolished French, although it sugar coated 
its actions with vague promises to implement some French rights m the future. 
The Franc-Saskois were lucky, said Premier Devine, because “we were this close 
[holding his thumb and index finger together] to completely denying the official 
use of French.”71 Prime Minister Mulroney said he was “pleased. . . I am sure 
that your government’s initiative will reflect the goodwill and generosity of the 
people of your province. . . .”72 Subsequently, under heavy fire from the 
editorialists,73 Mr. Mulroney became inventive. He blamed former Prune Minis­
ter Trudeau for the plight of the Franc-Saskois, a remark that occasioned the only 
laughter from the President of the Franc-Saskois, Mr. Baudais, during the entire 
affair.74 Quebeckers stood by impotently, watching their tiny Franc-Saskois 
cousins being mauled in the grizzly Saskatchewan political machine.
The journalists poured predictable fuel on the flames by asking: Will 
Quebec punish its anglophone minority in retaliation?” Two wrongs, of course, 
do not make a right, but the journalists rightly sensed a deep sense of frustration 
and anger gnawing away in Quebec. To make matters worse, Quebeckers 
watched on television, while their Premier, sitting with Saskatchewan s Premier 
Devine, praised Devine’s stinginess to the Franc-Saskois as prudent and 
“responsible,” and flattered Mr. Devine as “one of the most dynamic leaders m 
this country ”75 This prompted the President of the Association canadien- 
ne-francais de l’Alberta, Mr. Ares, to cancel a planned meeting with Mr 
B o u r a s s a ,  calling Bourassa a “traitor.”76 Mr. Bourassa was unfazed. He advised
70The Language Act, S.S. 1988, c. L-6.1, s.13.
71 [Toronto] Globe and Mail, (20 April 1988) at Al.
^Letter of Mr. Mulroney to Mr. Devine (8 April 1988) available from the Prime Minister’s Office.
73Lise Bissonette, “Dealing another blow to the French minorities,” [Toronto] Globe and Mail (9 
April 1988) at D2.
74“Francophones’ Plight is Trudeau’s Fault, Mulroney tells House,” [Toronto] Globe and Mail (20 
April 1988) at Al.
^ “Saskatchewan Language Bill Gets Support from Bourassa,” [Toronto] Globe and Mail (14 Apnl 
1988) at Al.
^ ‘French Groups Blast Bourassa for Backing Sask. Language Bill,” [Ottawa] The Citizen (14 April 
1988) at 1.
Alberta francophones to trust their Premier who was “one of the strongest sup­
porters of Quebec in reaching an agreement on the Meech Lake Accord why 
will you not trust him?”77 Mr. Getty told Mr. Bourassa to mind his own busi­
ness. Then Mr. Getty abolished the French language in Alberta.79 While west­
ern language problems raged out of control Quebeckers felt not only wronged, 
they felt humiliated.
The language issue caused problems with acceptance of the Meech Lake Ac­
cord. Globe and Mail columnist Lise Bissonnette, expressing the view of many in­
fluential commentators, observed that “the general outrage [about Saskatchewan! 
was turning against the Meech Lake Accord [because] the Saskatchewan case was 
deemed to be a casebook illustration of the Accord’s flaws with respect to the 
protection of minority language rights in this country.”"  As Canadians turned 
away from Meech Lake, Quebeckers felt increasingly rejected and powerless. 
Even Quebec’s minimal five conditions accommodated in the Meech Lake Ac­
cord appeared unobtainable.
The climate of opinion in Quebec turned nasty. Graffiti appeared all over 
Montreal expressing hostility to anglophones. There were attacks on F.ngi;gh 
guage business establishments. The St. Jean Baptiste Society organized a 
demonstration in support of Bill 101 expecting to draw a few hundred people. 
Twenty-five thousand excited activists came out to parade. Opinion-makers who 
previously thought the language issue was well regulated and basically solved by 
Bill 101 began to feel they were wrong; something, unspecified, needed to be 
done. The press became mesmerized by the language issue, the Meech l-ake 
debates and the impending failure of the Accord. Important opinion-makers felt 
frustrated, powerless, anxious.
At this point the Supreme Court of Canada stumbled again into the picture. 
The Court was asked to invalidate Bill 101 insofar as Bill 101 required French 
only m commercial advertising and firm names, and to annul Quebec’s wholesale 
opt-out of the Charter o f Rights.*1 In keeping with its new approach, the Court 
returned the issue to provincial politics by rejecting the federalism attack on Bill 
101 and inviting use of the notwithstanding option to cure free expression and 
non-discrimination violations.82 This opened the door immediately to an
71 Ibid.
^ ‘Getty to Tell Bourassa Not to Meddle on Language,” [Toronto] Globe and Mail (11 April 1988)
at A3.
T9Languages Act, SA. 1988, C  L-7.5, s.7.
“ [Toronto] Globe and Mail (9 April 1988) at D2. 
aïSinger v. A.G. Quebec; A.G. Quebec v. Chaussure Brown
8fThc1ov*ÎJide had challenged on grounds of substantive review. The theoiy of the attack was 
that the Charter section overridden had to be specified in order to bring the democratic process to 
bear on the legislator. The court stated: “In so far as requirements of the democratic process are 
relevant, this is the form of reference used in legislative drafting with respect to legislative provisions 
tobe amended or repealed. There is no reason why more should be required under s.33;” Chaussure 
Brown, at 29. Mr. Bourassa repeatedly referred to the Court’s “legitimization” of the override in the 
subsequent controversy respecting Quebec’s invocation of s.33 in respect of Bill 178.
acrimonious debate within and without Quebec, a further exercise in langage 
pathology which continues at this writing.® In the provinces with anglophone 
majorities, the Quebec haters parade their spleen in more or less concealed 
forms. The nationalist movement in Quebec is reinvigorated. There is an in­
creased amount of violence against anglophone businesses in Quebec and mass 
demonstrations in favour of tougher language laws. Manitoba used the events as 
an excuse to withdraw support for the Meech Lake Accord, making it unlikely 
that the Accord can become law without amendment. Quebec’s anglophone mi­
nority is insecure, fearful; experiencing the shell-shocked dread upsetting fran­
cophone minorities in other provinces.84 The only comic relief is provided by 
Prime Minister Mulroney. He conjured up Mr. Trudeau to blame for the prob­
lems.
The situation is unhealthy and Canada’s seam is opening. Premier McKenna 
of New Brunswick summed up the situation: “Canadians,” he said, “are adopting 
an attitude of to hell with minorities that threatens to divide the nation and pit 
anglophones against francophones.. .  We are beginning to see a reversal of the 
vision we have seen emerge in the last 20 years.. .  . The Province of Quebec is 
increasingly looking to become unilingual French and the other provinces 
uniHngual English - to hell with minorities. We are going to be facing, m the fu­
ture, two solitudes in this country.”
VI
Parliament, the legislatures, and the courts have no serious policy to counteract 
assimilation. In the absence of determined government policy to alter 
demographic forces, numbers tell all. In Canada the numbers are dear and the 
trends are unmistakable. Whether measured by maternal language or home lan­
guage, outside of Quebec francophones are declining in real numbers and as a 
percentage of total provincial population. Whether measured by maternal lan­
guage or home language, anglophones in Quebec are declining in real numbers
®By Bill 178 the Bourassa government overrode the Charter o f Rights and reinstituted a French only 
requirement. See an Bill 178, Act to Amend The Charter o f the French Language, 2nd sess. 33d Legis­
lature, 1988. The explanatory note reads that the Bill “lays down the rule that public signs and 
posters and commercial advertising, outside or intended for the public outside must be solely in 
French.” It also provides that “this rule applies inside public means of transport and certain estab­
lishments, particularly commercial centres.” Secondly, it requires “public signs and posters and com­
mercial advertising inside establishments” to be in French [subject to exceptions]. See Decision 
draws condemnation from both sides, The [Ottawa] Citizen (14 December 1988) at Al.
m“9,ooo Quebeckers rally to keep BUI 101,” The [Ottawa] Citizen (19 December 1988) at A3; “Les 
représentants anglophones: Des démissions aggraveraient le désarroi de leur communauté, 
[Montreal] Le Devoir (20 December 1988) at P6; “Des francophones hors-Québec sont divisés, 
[Montreal] Le Devoir (20 December 1988) at P3; “Bourassa trouve le Canada anglais nerveux, 
[Ottawa] Le Droit (20 December 1988) at PI; “Rémillard menace de se retirer des discussions, 
[Ottawa] Le Droit, (20 December 1988) at P li (“Le ministre de Justice du Québec...  a menacé hier 
de ne plus participe a aucune discussion constitutionelle tant que l’accord du lac Meechn’aurajœ  
été adopté”); “Actes de vandalisme a Montréal,” [Ottawa] Le Droit (20 December 1988) at P12; 
“Filmon Criticism of Decision [to use notwithstanding clause] Triggers Angry Riposte from 
Quebec,” [Toronto] Globe A Mail (20 December 1988) at Al.
and as a percentage of total provincial population. The decline is rapid, steep and 
alarming. The assimilation rates are extraordinary.
Some examples might help to illustrate what is happening. In the five years 
between 1981 and 1986 the francophone community outside of Quebec lost 
40,000 people, declining to 842,815 or 4.48 per cent of the population, measured 
by maternal language. Measured by the language used in the home, fran­
cophones declined 51,075 to 575,100, or 3.06 per cent of the population. The as­
similation rates are accelerating. In Nova Scotia, for example, between 1981 and 
1986 37 per cent of the community was lost to assimilation.
Examples from some provinces illuminate the picture from a startling per­
spective. In Manitoba, 39,600 people used French in the home in 1971. In 1981 
that number dropped to 29,065; in 1986 it fell to 23,840. In Saskatchewan, 15,930 
people used French as the home language in 1971; in 1981 that number was 
reduced to 9,175; in 1986 it was 6,670. In Alberta, 22,700 people used French as 
the language of the home in 1971. Because of the energy boom, that number in­
creased to 25,930 in 1981. In 1986, the number dropped to 17,640.
In the five years between 1981 and 1986, measured by maternal language, 
anglophones in Quebec lost 61,520 souls, declining to 580,030; from 10.0 per cent 
to 8.9 per cent of the provincial population. Measured by language used in the 
home anglophones declined from 1.1 million to 676,050, an amazing 42 per cent 
drop in the Anglo-Quebec community over five short years.95
VII
The official language minorities are disappearing rapidly. Some, the Franco- 
Terre Neuviens and the Franc-Saskois, have already disappeared.86 This is exactly 
where we did not want to go, and why we instituted the official langiiagp. policy in 
the first place in 1969. The official languages policy has carried us a long d is ta n t  
towards the unwanted situation of two monolingual enclaves: French in Quebec, 
English in the rest of Canada. The new Official Languages Act, proclaimed in 
force on September 15, 1988, is a fortified version of the 1969 policy.87 The 
Meech Lake Accord is not even more of the same; it is less of the same. It 
detracts from the fundamental vision of Canada’s linguistic condominium estab­
lished during the Trudeau years.
^  numbers are taken from Recensement Canada 1986, a publication of the F.F.H.Q., summariz­
ing data from the 1986 census.
“ Between 1971 and 1981, the small francophone community in Newfoundland shrank 21 per cent, to 
a mere 1800 persons. In my lexicon, this counts as “a disappearance,” since there are no cmnnqifr 
incentives to use French, no institutional structures to support the French language, and such a small 
concentration (0.3 per cent of provincial population) as to make private use of the French language 
rare indeed. In Saskatchewan during the same period, the Franc-Saskois community contracted by 
37 per cent to 9,000 people, or 1 per cent of provincial population. In 1986 the Franc-Saskois had 
declined to 6,600 people.
^S.C. 1988, c. 38.
What are these legislative and constitutional reforms meant to achieve? Are 
they meant to achieve the grand vision of a Trudeau-esque Canada populatedM  
thriving official language minorities from sea to sea, conceived m the 1969 Policy 
and evoked in the subsequent Reports of the Official Languages Commissioner? 
If this is the goal of the updated Official Languages Act there is little doubt that it 
will fail Massaging the 1969 Policy will not change anything. The demoçaphic 
trends will remain relentless, accelerating in this final terminal stage, as the last 
miniscule mass of the minorities melts away.
Superimposed upon a predominantly French Quebec and a predominantly 
Fnglisti Canada outside of Quebec will be an increased population of bilinguals, 
both in Quebec and in the other provinces - the result of the new Quebec and the 
immersion phenomenon. As conceived in Mr. Trudeau’s vision, these bilinguals 
were meant to relate significantly to the critical mass of language minorities. It 
was thought that immersion graduates in Manitoba would reinforce theFranco- 
Manitoban community, that community having been secured by the 1969 Policy. 
The hard truth is that there will be no critical mass of Franco-Mamtobans. So it 
is appropriate to ask again: What is the significance of the increased numbers of 
bilinguals? Where do we think we are going?
We are not going in the direction of Mr. Trudeau’s vision as conceived by the 
1969 policy. We are travelling in an opposite direction. To reverse course would 
require a massive governmental effort.88 Is there any foreseeable political 
scenario in which this effort might occur?
The new reality is that we shall shortly have a Canada where languages are 
territorially concentrated: French in Quebec and English outside of Quebec. 
The federal administration will be made up of bilinguals who will come from the 
remnants of the official language minorities, French and English elites, and the 
immersion graduates. There will also be a reduced critical mass of official lan­
guage minorities in the “bilingual belt” which stretches from Moncton in New 
Brunswick to the Soo in Northern Ontario.® Outside of that belt, the mmonties 
will have disappeared.
The 1988 official languages policy would thus appear to have two goals. First, 
official languages policy seeks to continue bilingualizing the federal administra­
tion. Secondly, the policy strives to lessen the pain of official language mmonties 
- to palliate them - while current demographic trends conclude their demolition. 
This policy differs from what is parroted by the authorities. Is it worth asking if 
Canadians accept this policy - the real policy?
“ The nature of the effort required is described in “The Future of Official Language Minorities” 
supra at note 11.
®The bilingual belt was first discussed by Richard J. Joy, Languages in Conflict (1967)- At 26 the au­
thor noted “the French speaking communities outside of the Soo-Moncton limit have become 
vanishing islands in a steadily-encroaching sea of English-speakers.. .  . The perpetuation of the 
French Ungimge seems assured within the Soo-Moncton limit.”
The hard truths of our demographic trends make it increasingly difficult to be 
sanguine about our official language policy. If we believe Mr. Trudeau’s vision is 
the prevailing inspiration of official languages policy, and that we are acting in 
pursuit of that vision, there is no problem. However, our demographic realities 
make it difficult to hold that belief. They present us with another, perhaps un­
wanted, image of Canada’s linguistic future. It therefore becomes necessary to 
imagine ourselves m new panoramas. Reality makes this effort possible; it also 
requires it. ’
